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The European Commission published a reflection paper at the end of May on deepening economic and monetary
union. Enrico Marelli and Marcello Signorelli present an analysis of the Commission’s proposals and respond to
some of the paper’s key weaknesses in laying out a path for future reforms.
The European Commission’s recent reflection paper on deepening economic and monetary union raises several
key questions about the past and future of the Eurozone. The paper certainly represents a positive contribution to
the ongoing process of European integration, after the impasse caused by the deep and prolonged economic crisis,
the political developments in some European countries (including the Brexit referendum) and the severe social
situation (the well-being of many citizens of the Eurozone is lower now than when the euro started). However, some
proposals were notably weak and some key issues are still lacking. We think it is more useful to focus on these latter
points in responding to the paper.
An overly positive assessment that misses key points
In the second section of the paper – titled ‘The story of the euro so far ’ – we disagree on the largely positive
assessment regarding economic performance in the Eurozone, before and, especially, during the crisis. A simple
comparison with the performance of the US or also EU countries outside the Eurozone (e.g. the UK, on the West
side, or Poland, on the East) would support our judgement. Not only has the overall performance been rather
unsatisfactory in the euro area, but wide differences have appeared within the area itself.
Considering the period after the euro’s introduction, for example, the Commission’s paper does not mention that the
hypothesis of the so called “endogeneity of optimum currency area criteria” had been substantially rejected even
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before the crisis, since real convergence has not been more evident in the Eurozone compared to other EU
countries. As the Commission rightly admits, before the crisis, convergence in economic growth was partly achieved
by unbalanced growth, which in some countries fuelled “bubbles” of different kinds. However, the competitiveness
gaps persisted until the crisis and have been partly reduced only thanks to the (economic and socially damaging)
“internal devaluations” of the recent period. It is also surprising that the Commission’s paper does not discuss the
different current account positions (excessive deficits in some countries but also too high surpluses in some others)
within the euro area and their implications.
In addition, as dramatically emerged during the crisis, the lack of stabilisation instruments – together with the
obvious absence of flexible exchange rates within the monetary union – and the institutional limitations of the ECB
(e.g. as lender of last resort for sovereign bonds) have been especially deleterious for the peripheral countries of the
Eurozone. These weaknesses and their consequences are only partially discussed in the Commission’s paper.
Austerity and structural reforms
More importantly, there is no adequate discussion of the fiscal rules and the largely pro-cyclical (austerity) policies
adopted in all Eurozone countries as the main response to the sovereign debt crisis. Although the Commission
admits that, in the future, such rules could be simpler and that “some see the rules today as too lax, others see them
as unduly constraining”, no remarks are made about the underestimation of the fiscal multipliers (as ultimately
recognised also by the IMF) and the failure of the so-called “expansionary austerity”.
The role of structural reforms for economic growth is overemphasised in the Commission’s paper, also suggesting
new incentive mechanisms for their adoption in member countries. However, in the account of the recent crisis, the
lack of “effective aggregate demand” has not been adequately stressed; no mention is made of technical questions
such as methods for computing the “output gaps”, the consequent “structural deficits” and the structural and cyclical
components of unemployment. Within the aggregate demand, the Commission recognises that a large fall
concerned investments, which are still below the pre-crisis level in the Eurozone as a whole; but it should be added
that, in some countries, the collapse has been equal to or above 30%, and the recovery in the past three years has
been largely insufficient.
In particular, the decline in public investment has been damaging on both the demand side (it reinforced the above
mentioned pro-cyclical impact of austerity policies) and the supply side (causing permanent losses in potential
growth, employment trends and productivity dynamics). From this point of view, the judgment of the impact of the
Juncker Plan seems too favourable in the Commission’s paper, without mention made of the very small amount of
resources from the EU budget and institutions (while the European Investment Bank could play a much greater role)
and without an assessment of the real “additional effect” on increasing private investment.
Completing economic and monetary union
In the third and fourth sections of the paper, there is a discussion of the ways to achieve a more complete “economic
and monetary union”. Completion of the EMU has been urged on several occasions by many policymakers and
scholars. In the Commission’s paper, there are some specific proposals to make the Eurozone more resilient to
future shocks and crises. The two options for introducing a “stabilisation function” – the European Investment
Protection Scheme and the European Unemployment Reinsurance – are both interesting.
However, on the one hand, they could effectively work only with more resources devoted to the EU – or, much better,
to a specific Eurozone – budget, and on the other hand, the 2025 deadline is too far away for contrasting the current
economic and social situation still hampering some countries. As for the Financial Union, looking beyond the
Banking Union and the Capital Markets Union (that also according to the Commission’s paper should be achieved
within a couple of years), the “sovereign bond-backed securities” proposal seems an ingenious (although second
best) solution, alternative to the Eurobonds, for which the political consensus is still lacking.
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It is true that much more rapid steps towards “economic union” are not politically feasible at the moment, although
Germany and other “core” countries might be reassured by appropriate incentive schemes that risk-sharing goes
hand-in-hand with risk-reduction. Nevertheless, without a strong improvement in the employment and income
situation in the peripheral Eurozone countries, most affected by the long crisis, it is extremely difficult to overcome
the lack of trust, the upsurge of nationalist and populist movements, with the effect of stopping the process toward
further integration.
Although the Commission’s paper cites the high popular support for the single currency (according to Eurobarometer
figures from 2017), it seems that in the past decade, in several countries, the European project has been
increasingly associated with crisis and austerity rather than with opportunities and growth. In any case, it is hard to
believe that if a big country like Italy exited the monetary union, then the euro could survive. In particular, the
Commission’s paper fails to stress to a sufficient extent the dramatic situation of young people in several Eurozone
countries (according to both unemployment and NEET rates). It does not mention that it is the support of the young
generations that is crucial for the future of a European project, as dreamed by the “founding fathers”, which is able
to avoid the progressive (economic and political) irrelevance of the national economies of the old continent in the
new global context.
Thus, the economic and social situation should be rapidly ameliorated in all of the Eurozone’s countries, continuing
the accommodative monetary policy stance, although with more effective solutions for the non-performing loans and
the other structural problems of the banking sector (rightly emphasised in the Commission’s paper). Yet this should
be accompanied by more growth-friendly fiscal policies, also increasing the weight of public investment on national
and European budgets: an immediate demand shock imparted by a very large European Investment plan (regarding
both infrastructure, research and education) is necessary and could be politically feasible if designed according to
an appropriate distribution across countries.
A “golden rule” on national budgets seems an easier option but, for several reasons, it is a second best solution with
respect to the use of a specific Eurozone budget, also to avoid a “second lost decade”. Only after the strengthening
of the recovery, the reduction of unemployment (especially among young people), and improvement of the social
conditions, will public opinion in the Eurozone really become much more sympathetic toward the steps necessary
for further economic and political integration. Finally, the Commission’s paper also contains some interesting
proposals for improving European democracy and governance, although the final goal of a “political union” is not
clearly defined.
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